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Abstract
A health care provider chooses unobservable service-quality and cost-reduction e¤orts. The e¤orts pro-
duce quality and cost e¢ ciency. An insurer observes quality and cost, and chooses how to disclose this
information to consumers. The insurer also decides how to pay the provider. In prospective payment, the
insurer fully discloses quality, and sets a prospective payment price. In cost reimbursement, the insurer
discloses a value index, a weighted average of quality and cost e¢ ciency, and pays a margin above cost. The
rst-best quality and cost e¤orts can be implemented by prospective payment and by cost reimbursement.
Cost reimbursemnt with value index eliminates dumping and cream skimming. Prospective payment with
quality index eliminates cream skimming.
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1 Introduction
The (provocative) title refers to prospective payment and cost reimbursement, the most common mechanisms
for paying health care providers. In prospective payment, a provider receives a xed price for delivering
a medical service, irrespective of resources used. In cost reimbursement, a provider receives a revenue
corresponding to resources used.1 These two payment methods have been studied extensively and intensively
in the past thirty years. The conventional wisdom is that prospective payment and cost reimbursement give
rise to di¤erent quality and cost incentives. In this paper, we describe a model in which prospective payment
and cost reimbursement can give rise to identical quality and cost incentives. This model di¤ers from the
conventional one only in how consumers learn about quality.
The canonical model is this. A health care provider chooses unobservable quality and cost-reduction
e¤orts, and incurs disutilities in doing so. The e¤orts produce quality and reduce costs. A higher quality
results in a higher variable cost and attracts more consumers, but a higher cost e¤ort reduces the variable
cost. An insurer wants to implement socially e¢ cient quality and cost e¤orts.
Under prospective payment, the provider internalizes the production cost, so its cost-reduction incentive
is aligned with social cost e¢ ciency. An appropriate prospective payment level may then be chosen to align
the providers prot motive with social quality e¢ ciency. Prospective payment kills two birds with one stone.
Cost reimbursement works in a perverse way. Because all variable costs will be reimbursed, the provider lacks
any incentive to expend cost e¤ort. The quality incentive can still be implemented by paying the provider a
margin above cost for services rendered. The provider raises quality to attract more consumers because of
the protable margin.
In the two payment systems, the common principle is demand response: higher quality raises demand, so
a higher prot margin incentivizes quality e¤ort. However, the provider internalizes costs under prospective
payment, but does not do so under cost reimbursement.
1For our purpose, cost reimbursement is the same as conventional fee-for-service: a provider chooses medical
services to supply, and receives a fee that amounts to the cost and a prot margin. Prospective payment may be
supplemented by outlier compensations, local-market adjustments, etc. These variations are unimportant here.
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A demand response requires consumers to know about quality. However, health care quality information
can be di¢ cult to obtain and interpret. Indeed, insurers, governments and sponsors increasingly have helped
consumers nd out about quality.2 In this paper, we make an alternative assumption about information
structure. We assume that consumers cannot observe quality directly, but the insurer can. The insurer
can also observe costs. We set up an implementation problem; the insurer would like the provider to choose
rst-best quality and cost e¤orts, which are hidden actions, by information disclosure and payment incentives.
We prove two main results. First, rst-best e¤orts can be implemented by prospective payment and full
disclosure of quality, so we rea¢ rm a result of the canonical model. Second, and this is the surprise, rst-
best e¤orts can be implemented by cost reimbursement and partial disclosure of quality and cost. Partial
information disclosure refers to a value index. A providers unobservable e¤orts produce quality and cost
e¢ ciency (cost saving from a benchmark). For any quality and cost produced, the insurer constructs a
weighted average and discloses this average the value index to consumers. We show that mixing quality
and cost e¢ ciency information can incentivize cost e¤ort.
Why is there cost incentive under cost reimbursement when a value index about quality and cost is
disclosed to consumers? Consumers only observe the value index, not quality, so they will draw inference
about quality based on the value index. A given level of value index corresponds to some inferred quality
level, which generates a demand. Consumersbelief about quality is based on the value index, not the actual
quality e¤ort. Hence, changing e¤orts that would maintain the index would leave demand (and revenue)
una¤ected. It follows that the provider must choose disutility-minimizing e¤orts to achieve an index.3
Furthermore, the insurer can choose the index weight and prot margin to make the provider internalize the
net social benet of quality and cost e¤orts.
Starting with the basic model, we then consider more complex environments. In one extension, we
consider dumping of high-cost consumers. Under prospective payment, the provider takes a loss when
2For a summary of empirical works on public reporting initiatives, see Dranove and Jin (2011).
3An agency explanation in line with the Mirrless-Holmstrom model goes as follows. An agent (the provider)
chooses unobservable inputs (e¤orts) that produce two outputs (quality and cost e¢ ciency). Consumer demand is
based on one output (quality), but consumers observe nothing. The principal (the insurer) observes the two outputs,
and (credibly) reports to consumers a weighted average. Belief on quality output depends only on the index. The
agents equilibrium e¤orts must minimize the disutility for achieving the index.
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treating high-cost consumers whose costs are higher than the price, so will refuse to serve them. We show
that dumping can be avoided under cost reimbursement, because cost variations will be absorbed by the
insurer. Implementation of rst-best e¤orts is possible under cost reimbursement, but not under prospective
payment.
In another extension, we study cream skimming when health services have multiple qualities. Cream
skimming refers to the overprovision of more protable qualities and the underprovision of less protable
qualities. We illustrate how prospective payment and full disclosure create cream skimming incentives.
We then show that under both prospective payment and cost reimbursement, the insurer can use partial
disclosure to neutralize the providers cream skimming incentives.4
It has not escaped our notice that our theory relies on the provider being unable to credibly disclose quality
information. If a provider were able to do so, it could defeat the value-index manipulation. In practice, there
does not seem to be any danger that any provider could fully disclose quality information. Otherwise,
public agencies (such as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) and nonprot organizations (such
as Consumer Reports and the National Committee for Quality Assurance) would not have expended huge
resources to make quality reports available to the general public. Furthermore, it is far from clear that a
provider would honestly report quality information even when it was feasible to do so.
1.1 Literature
The literature on provider payment design is large. For surveys, see Newhouse (1996), McGuire (2000),
and Leger (2008). Ma (1994) lays out the basic model of payment systems and their e¤ects on health care
quality and cost incentives. The general consensus is that cost reimbursement fails to achieve cost e¢ ciency,
and that prospective payment leads to perverse selection incentives such as dumping and cream skimming.
Generally, neither cost reimbursement nor prospective payment achieves socially e¢ cient outcomes.
We assume a demand response: consumersdemand for services reacts positively to quality, an assumption
4Prospective payment also encourages fraudulentupcoding. For example, Medicare uses the Diagnostic Related
Group system to set prices. If an illness ts into more than one diagnosis (perhaps due to severity di¤erences), a
provider may choose to report the one with a higher price (Dafny, 2005).
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commonly adopted in the literature: see for example, Rogerson (1994), Ma and McGuire (1997), Frank et
al. (2000), Glazer and McGuire (2000), Brekke et al. (2006).5 Recent papers empirically evaluate demand
response to public reports. In commercial health-plan markets, both Beaulieu (2002) and Scanlon et al. (2002)
show that consumers do avoid health plans with low ratings. Since 1999, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services has launched quality-report initiatives for health plans, hospitals, physicians, and nursing
homes (see www.cms.gov/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/). Dafny and Dranove (2008) nd that the reports for
Medicare health plans substantially a¤ect enrollments.
Our paper is closely related to a small but growing literature on optimal public-report design. Glazer
and McGuire (2006) propose a disclosure policy that achieves cross subsidies among ex ante heterogenous
consumers to solve an adverse selection problem in a competitive market. Ma and Mak (2014a) characterize
the optimal average-quality reports that mitigate monopoly price discrimination and quality distortion.
The current paper contributes to the literature by simultaneously studying optimal payment and reporting
policies in a hidden-action framework.
Information asymmetry has long been viewed as a source of ine¢ ciency in the physician-patient inter-
action literature. For example, in both Dranove (1988) and Rochaix (1989), a physician utilizes his private
information to induce patient demand for excessive treatments. By contrast, the insurer in our model holds
back some information from consumers to induce cost-reduction e¤ort.
Information disclosure has been extensively studied in the industrial organization literature. In Matthews
and Postlewaite (1985) and Schlee (1996), product quality is unknown to the seller, consumers, or both. They
show that quality information can harm consumers because of the sellers price response. Instead, we focus
on how a trusted intermediary can utilize demand response to discipline a seller. In both Lizzeri (1999) and
Albano and Lizzeri (2001), a prot-maximizing intermediary privately observes product quality. They show
that the intermediary may underprovide quality information at the expense of market e¢ ciency. However,
the insurer in our model withholds information to achieve e¢ cient quality and cost e¤ort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 sets up the
5One exception is Chalkley and Malcomson (1998). In their model, a capacity-constrained provider is motivated
by altruism rather than demand response.
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information structure, the extensive forms, and studies equilibria. We rst study prospective payment,
and then turn to cost reimbursement and value index. Section 4 presents three extensions. We allow for
stochastic production of quality by means of a standard hidden-action model. Then we consider stochastic
cost reduction and study dumping. Finally, we let the provider produce many qualities and study cream
skimming. Section 5 draws some conclusions. The Appendix collects proofs, and an example is worked out
in the Supplement.
2 Model
2.1 Consumers and a provider
A set of consumers is covered by an insurer. Health services are to be supplied by a provider. If consumers
believe that health care quality is q, the quantity demanded is D(q), which is strictly increasing and con-
cave. The demand for health services also depends on copayments, deductibles, coinsurance rates, or their
combinations. We let consumer cost-share parameters be given, so the demand function D already incorpo-
rates consumer cost shares. This makes for simpler notation because we are concerned with incentives for
providers.6 The social benet from quality q is denoted by B(q) which is strictly increasing and concave. In
many applications B is consumer benet from services, but we allow a more general interpretation so that
externalities, equity, and any other such issues can be included.
A provider supplies health services to insured consumers. Its actions a¤ect health care quality and cost
e¢ ciency. We call these actions quality e¤ort, and cost e¤ort, denoted by the nonnegative variables e and
r, respectively. Quality and cost e¤orts are unobservable. Quality depends on e¤ort e. In this and the next
section, we assume deterministic quality production from e¤ort e, so write quality q as a function of e¤ort
q(e). We assume that q is strictly increasing and concave.7 Later, in Subsection 4.1, we use a standard
hidden-action model for stochastic quality production: we let e¤ort e determine a distribution of possible
6We also abstract from strategic interaction among providers. This issue is addressed in Ma and Mak (2014b).
There we show that when heterogeneous providers compete for consumers in a health care network, rst-best imple-
mentation requires the insurer to coordinate disclosure, copayment, and provider payment policies.
7The inverse of the function q yields the e¤ort that is used to achieve a quality. However, in this work, we only
allow payments to be based on quantities.
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qualities, as in Holmstrom (1979).
The unit cost for service is C(e; r) given quality e¤ort e and cost e¤ort r. The function C is strictly
increasing in e and strictly decreasing in r, and strictly convex. More e¤ort on care quality requires a higher
unit cost, but cost-reduction e¤ort can reduce it. In addition, the provider incurs a xed cost or disutility
due to e¤orts, denoted by (e; r). The function  is strictly increasing and strictly convex. We assume
that e¤orts are to be chosen from a (nonnegative) bounded set, and that equilibrium e¤ort choices must be
interior.8 If the demand is D(q(e)), the provider incurs a total cost D(q(e))C(e; r) + (e; r).
2.2 Payment and information mechanisms
The quantity of services is observed ex post and payment can be based on it. The unit cost of services
C(e; r) is also observed ex post, and again payment can be based on it. Quality-cost e¤ort disutilities are
unobservable. We study the conventional payment systems: prospective payment and cost reimbursement,
which currently still account for most providersrevenue.9 We consider the use of information about quality
and cost as an incentive instrument to supplement the conventional systems. The study of other systems
such as pay-for-performance and valued-based purchases is left to other research.10
Under prospective payment, the provider receives a xed price p per unit of delivered service. If the
provider has satised a demand of D(q(e)), its revenue is pD(q(e)), and it bears the total cost D(q(e)) 
C(e; r) +(e; r). Under cost reimbursement, for each unit of delivered services the provider will be paid the
variable cost C(e; r) plus a margin m. If the provider has satised a demand D(q(e)), its revenue, net of
variable cost, is mD(q(e)), and it only bears the disutility (e; r). Prospective payment p and the margin m
are nonnegative. The providers disutility due to e¤ort, (e; r), cannot be observed and directly compensated
8 In other words, we impose the common Inada conditions. Using subscripts to denote partial derivatives of the
corresponding variables, we assume i) C1(e; r) ! 0 and 1(e; r) ! 0, as e ! 0; C2(e; r) !  1 and 2(e; r) ! 0 as
r ! 0, and ii) C1(e; r) ! 1 and 1(e; r) ! 1 as e approaches its upper bound; C2(e; r) ! 0 and 2(e; r) ! 1 as
r approaches its upper bound.
9 In 2009, 79% of employees covered by employer-provided health plans received benets under fee-for-service
arrangements (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). In 2012, 73% of Medicare enrollees were covered by fee-for-service
plans (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2013). The Centers use prospective payment to reimburse hospital
services and a xed fee schedule to reimburse physician services.
10 In 2014, prospective payment and cost reimbursement accounted for 60% of commercial in-network payments
(Catalyst for Payment Reform, 2014).
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for. The provider may also receive a lump-sum payment, which can be positive or negative.
Our departure from the standard payment-design problem is on the information about quality. In the
literature, consumers are assumed to observe quality. Here, consumers are unable to observe quality, and
rely on the insurer to act as a trusted information intermediary. Although both quality and cost e¤orts are
unobservable, the insurer can observe the providers care quality q and variable cost C(e; r). The insurer
may disclose information fully, or choose to disclose an index, constructed as follows. First, we posit that
there is a ceiling K so that the variable cost C(e; r) is at most K. Given e¤orts, K  C(e; r) is a measure of
cost e¢ ciency. We dene a value index by I(q; C; )  q(e) + (1  )[K   C(e; r)], where 0    1. After
observing the providers care quality q(e) and variable cost C(e; r), the insurer reports the value index to
consumers.
If we set the weight of the value index  to 1, then full quality information will be revealed to consumers.
If  is always set to 1, consumers observe the providers quality choice and respond by demanding health
care; this would be the standard model. The point of our paper, however, is that the weight should be set
below 1 under cost reimbursement.
2.3 First best
In the rst best, quality and cost e¤orts are contractible. The social welfare from the quality-cost e¤ort pair
(e; r) is
B(q(e)) D(q(e))C(e; r)  (e; r); (1)
where B is social benet. Let (e; r) be the quality-cost e¤ort pair that maximizes social welfare in (1),
which is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in e¤orts. The following rst-order conditions characterize the
rst best:
B0(q(e))q0(e) D0(q(e))q0(e)C(e; r) D(q(e))C1(e; r)  1(e; r) = 0 (2)
 D(q(e))C2(e; r)  2(e; r) = 0; (3)
where we use the (numeral) subscript of a function to denote the corresponding partial derivative, and the
superscript prime to denote derivatives. The rst-order conditions have the standard interpretations. Raising
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quality e¤ort increases social benet, but it also raises demand, unit cost, and disutility. Raising cost e¤ort
reduces unit cost but raises disutility. The rst-order conditions in (2) and (3) balance these e¤ects.
3 Payment systems and implementation
3.1 Prospective payment and rst best
We let the insurer be a public agency. The insurers objective is to maximize a weighted sum of social net
benet and the providers prot, with a lower weight on prot.11 In prospective payment, the provider
receives a price p per unit of service, and a transfer T . Suppose that the insurer fully discloses quality q (by
setting  = 1 in the index I(q; C; )). When the provider chooses quality and cost e¤orts, its payo¤ is
T + pD(q(e)) D(q(e))C(e; r)  (e; r): (4)
The quality and cost e¤orts generate a social net benet
B(q(e))  pD(q(e))  T; (5)
which is the social benet B(q(e)) less payments to the provider.
The insurers objective is to choose the prospective price p and the transfer T to maximize
w[B(q(e))  pD(q(e))  T ] + (1  w)[T + pD(q(e)) D(q(e))C(e; r)  (e; r)]; (6)
where :5 < w  1. The provider must make a nonnegative prot, so (4) must be nonnegative. Given that
the welfare weight is larger on social net benet, the optimal transfer T  will make prot in (4) equal to
zero. A choice of p implements the providers best response in e and r to maximize prot (4). The following
proposition is adapted from Ma (1994), and stated with its proof omitted:
Proposition 1 By choosing p =
B0(q(e))
D0(q(e))
and a suitable transfer T , the insurer implements the rst-best
quality e¤ort e and cost e¤ort r.
11The transfer will be used to limit the providers prots when the insurers objective puts more weight on social net
benet. Otherwise, the transfer would be undened. This is a common assumption; see, for example, the regulators
objective function (9) on p916 in Baron and Myerson (1982).
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The intuition is well documented in the literature. Under prospective payment, the provider fully inter-
nalizes the social cost of quality and cost e¤orts. Its incentive on cost e¢ ciency aligns with the insurers.
By setting the prospective price at the p in Proposition 1, the insurer makes the provider internalize the
social benet of quality as well. Any prot from the prospective payment is taxed away by the transfer, so
the rst best is implemented.
3.2 Cost reimbursement, value index, and rst best
We study the following extensive-form game:
Stage 1 The insurer sets the transfer T , the margin m, and the weight  in the value index, and commits
to reimbursing the providers variable cost.
Stage 2 The provider chooses unobservable quality and cost e¤orts, respectively, e and r.
Stage 3 The insurer observes the providers quality q and the variable cost C, and reports the value index
I(q; C; )  q + (1  )[K   C] to consumers.
Stage 4 Consumers learn the level of value index I (but not the providers quality, variable cost, or e¤orts),
and decide on the quantity of services to obtain.
In this game, the insurers strategy consists of the transfer T , the margin m and the weight . The
providers strategy consists of the quality and cost e¤orts, e and r (both being functions of the insurers
choices in Stage 1). Consumers do not observe the providers quality e¤ort, and form beliefs about it (as well
as cost e¤ort) based on the value index.12 Given belief on e¤ort, say be, demand will be given by D(q(be)).
We solve for perfect-Bayesian equilibria under a belief restriction.
Suppose that in an equilibrium, the provider chooses quality-cost e¤ort pair (be; br). The value index
becomes bI  q(be) + (1   )[K   C(be; br)]. Then in equilibrium, consumers must correctly infer from bI
that quality is q(be), and their demand will be D(q(be)). What about indexes that are o¤ the equilibrium
12Consumer belief of cost e¤ort does not a¤ect demand, but this belief is part of the description of a perfect-Bayesian
equilibrium.
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path? What should consumers believe when they observe an index di¤erent from bI? We adopt the wary
belief restriction by McAfee and Schwartz (1994, p221-222).13 For our game, the restriction says that when
consumers observe an index, they believe that the provider has chosen quality and cost e¤orts optimally to
achieve that index. In e¤ect, we draw no distinction between indexes that are on or o¤ the equilibrium path.
Denition 1 (Wary Belief) A quality-cost e¤ort pair (e; er) is said to satisfy wary belief at index eI if 1)
q(e) + (1  )[K   C(e; er)] = eI, and 2)
(e; er) = argmax
e;r
T +mD(q(e))  (e; r) (7)
subject to q(e) + (1  )[K   C(e; r)] = eI: (8)
For any index eI and e¤ort pair (e; er), wary belief requires that indeed the e¤orts can generate the index;
this refers to the rst condition in the denition. Next, wary belief requires that e¤orts maximize prot when
consumers believe quality e¤ort to be e. Now, revenue is T +mD(q(e)) given belief, but many quality-cost
e¤ort pairs with di¤erent disutilities can achieve eI. The prot from di¤erent quality-cost e¤ort pairs are in
(7). Hence, under wary belief (e; er) must maximize the providers prot (7) given index eI is to be achieved.
Our key Lemma characterizes all quality-cost e¤ort pairs at each index level that satisfy wary belief. (Proofs
are in the Appendix.)
Lemma 1 Under wary belief, for any index I; consumers believe that quality-cost e¤ort pair (e; er) solves
min
e;r
(e; r)
subject to q(e) + (1  )[K   C(e; r)] = I: (9)
Hence, for 0 <  < 1, (e; er) satises
1(e; er)
2(e; er) =  q
0(e)  (1  )C1(e; er)
(1  )C2(e; er) : (10)
At each I and 0 <  < 1, there is a unique e¤ort pair that satises wary belief. Furthermore, er > 0 if and
only if  < 1, and e> 0 if and only if  > 0.
13Wary belief is often adopted in the industrial organization literature. Recent papers that use the restriction
include Arya and Mittendorf (2011), Inderst and Ottaviani (2012), Nocke and White (2007), and Rey and Verge
(2004).
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Lemma 1 states that under wary belief, quality and cost e¤orts must minimize their disutility for achieving
any level of the value index. For a given index level I, consumersbelief about q(e) is xed, and so is the
revenue T +mD(q(e)). The maximization of (7) is the same as the minimization of (e; r). The condition in
(10) gives the optimality condition for the constrained minimization of (e; r). The left-hand side of (10) is
the ratio of the marginal disutilities and must be equal to the ratio of the marginal contributions of quality
and cost e¤orts to achieve the index, given the quality weight .
For a given weight  and a level of the index bI, equilibrium e¤orts are unique. This follows from the
convexity of  and the convexity of the constrained set. For strictly positive quality and cost e¤orts, the
weight  must be strictly between 0 and 1. The striking implication of Lemma 1 is that even when unit
variable costs, C(e; r), are completely reimbursed, the provider still has an incentive to exert cost e¤ort. The
key is that consumers infer quality from the value index. Cost e¤ort contributes to the value index, so prot
is maximized by a combination of quality and cost e¤orts.14
Lemma 1 stems from the provider maximizing prots. Even if consumers used an arbitrary rule to infer
quality from index, say an increasing function 	(I), the providers revenue would remain una¤ected by any
deviations that would maintain the same index level. In equilibrium the provider must still choose e¤orts to
minimize the disutility from achieving the index.
Equilibrium e¤orts can be illustrated in Figure 1. Because (e; r) is convex, its lower contour sets,
f(e; r) : (e; r)  g, are convex, so in Figure 1 we show an iso-disutility line 1 concave to the origin.
Consider the constraint in Lemma 1. Because q is concave and C is convex, the upper contour sets,
f(e; r) : q(e) + (1   )[K   C(e; r)]  Ig, are convex. In Figure 1, the iso-index lines, at levels I1 and I2,
I1 < I2, are the circular lines. A solution to the disutility minimization problem in Lemma 1 is the tangency
point between the iso-index and iso-disutility lines. As the level of the value index changes, condition (10)
denes a unique pair of e¤orts for every level of the value index I. In Figure 1, the dotted expansion path
14Wary belief coincides with the restriction that consumers cannot believe the provider choosing a weakly dominated
strategy. Suppose the provider chooses an o¤-equilibrium index I 0. Suppose that in the continuation game, some
consumers decide to obtain services. The providers payo¤ would be higher if it had chosen the quality-cost e¤ort
pair to minimize the disutility rather than any other pair. For any I 0, all e¤ort pairs are weakly dominated by the
disutility-minimizing pair.
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Figure 1: Disutility-minimizing quality and cost e¤orts
plots these quality-cost e¤ort pairs. Changing the index weight  corresponds to changing the entire map of
the iso-index lines.
For any  and I, let e(I; ) and r(I; ) be the unique solution of the disutility minimization program
in Lemma 1. They are implicitly dened by (10) and the constraint (9). Furthermore, let (I; ) 
(e(I; ); r(I; )). It can be veried easily that  is strictly increasing and convex in I (and the proof is in
the Appendix).
How does the provider choose equilibrium e¤orts in Stage 2? Given beliefs in Lemma 1, any equilibrium
e¤ort choice must be given by e(I; ) and r(I; ) for each I. Hence, we can equivalently let the provider
choose an index level. For example, if the provider chooses to achieve the index level I1 in Figure 1, the
corresponding e¤orts must be e and er. We rewrite the providers prot as
T +mD(q(e(I; )))  (I; ): (11)
In the Appendix, we write down su¢ cient conditions for the prot in (11) to be strictly quasi-concave in I.
These conditions say that equilibrium e¤ort e(I; ) is concave in the index I; so e(I; ) cannot increase in I
at an increasing rate. When (11) is strictly quasi-concave, we can relate the providers equilibrium e¤orts to
the margin and index weight by the rst-order conditions of prot maximization.
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Recall that rst-best e¤orts are e and r in Subsection 2.3. Now dene I and  by
I = q(e) + (1  )[K   C(e; r)] (12)
1(e
; r)
2(e; e)
=  
q(e)  (1  )C1(e; r)
(1  )C2(e; e) =
C1(e
; r)
C2(e; r)
  

1  
q0(e)
C2(e; r)
: (13)
What is the rationale behind this construction of a particular pair of index and weight? From Lemma 1, any
weight  and I uniquely determine a pair of e¤orts given by (10). We have taken (10) and set  to  so that
the rst-best e¤orts satisfy (10), which we now rewrite as (13). Furthermore, if the value index happens to
take the value of I in (12), equilibrium e¤orts will be rst best. If the provider can be incentivized to choose
I, rst-best e¤orts will be equilibrium e¤orts. The payment margin that implements rst-best e¤orts is
m =
1(I
; )
D0(q)q0(e)e1(I; )
; (14)
and we can now state our result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the prot function (11) is strictly quasi-concave in I. The insurer implements
the rst-best e¤orts (e; r) in the unique continuation equilibrium by setting the weight of the value index
to  in (13) and the cost margin to m in (14), and a suitable transfer T .
Consumers infer quality from the value index. This inference stems from the key Lemma 1. The Lemma
also indicates how the provider must choose e¤orts to attain any level of the index. By setting the weight at ,
rst-best e¤orts are optimal at index level I (see (12) and (13) above). Any payment margin m incentivizes
the provider to raise the index, and therefore both quality and cost e¤orts. The prot-maximizing index is
one where the marginal prot mD0(q)q0(e)e1(I; ) is equal to marginal disutility 1(I; ). The value of
m ensures that the index I is the prot-maximizing index. The point of Proposition 2 is that information
disclosure and payment policy can be coordinated for implementation of e¢ cient cost and quality e¤orts
even when variable costs are fully reimbursed.
It is important that consumers rely on the value index to infer about quality. If a provider could credibly
reveal its quality, it could avoid the constraint on the equilibrium mix of quality and cost e¤ort due to the
value index (Lemma 1). Cost information per se is not valuable to consumers. If the provider does not
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need to exert cost e¤ort to convey quality information to consumers, the perverse cost e¤ort property of cost
reimbursement remains. The policy implication is perhaps quite obvious: public agencies should have a keen
interest in information disclosure. A more radical policy would require public certication or regulation of
any information disclosure.
It seems di¢ cult for a rm to credibly disclose product qualities. The general consensus in the literature
is that disclosure may involve another interested party, and a new set of incentive problems arises. (See again
our discussion of that literature in Subsection 1.1.) Disclosure by a public agency or a trusted nonprot
organization may be more credible. Also, an insurer aiming to control cost in the long run should have an
incentive to build a reputation of trustworthiness. That trust allows the implementation of the rst best.
4 Extensions: stochastic quality, dumping, and cream skimming
In this section, we consider three extensions. First, we use a stochastic quality production model common
in the principal-agent literature. Then we allow the provider to serve only protable patients when costs
are stochastic. Next, we revert to the deterministic production model but let health services have many
qualities. This version allows us to consider cream skimming.
4.1 Stochastic quality and value index
In the previous section, the providers quality e¤ort produces quality in a deterministic fashion. We now
consider stochastic quality production. We use the standard hidden-action model of Mirrlees (1976) and
Holmstrom (1979). Quality e¤ort e determines a distribution on quality q, a random variable dened on R+,
the positive real numbers.15 For any quality level q, the insurer cannot rule out any quality e¤ort e. We
write the density function of q as f(qje), and assume that the expected demand is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in quality e¤ort. That is,
R
R+ D(q)f(qje)dq is strictly increasing and concave in e.
We rst provide the notation for the rst best. The social welfare expression in (1) is rewritten as
15The full-support assumption is commonly made. There are two reasons. First, nonoverlapping supports in
qualities as e¤ort changes may allow the insurer to infer e¤ort, so our assumption eliminates that kind of inference.
Second, a full quality support serves as an approximation to any model with a bounded support; we can simply set
the density to be arbitrarily close to zero.
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R
R+ [B(q) D(q)C(e; r)] f(qje)dq   (e; r). Here, the integral is the expected social benet less variable
costs while the remaining term is the e¤ort disutility, and we assume that social welfare is strictly quasi-
concave in e¤orts. For completeness, we write down the characterization of the rst-best quality and cost
e¤orts in this notation (but compare them with (2) and (3)):
Z
R+

[B(q) D(q)C(e; r)]

@f(qje)
@e

 D(q)C1(e; r)f(qje)

dq   1(e; r) = 0Z
R+
[ D(q)C2(e; r)] f(qje)dq   2(e; r) = 0:
Stochastic quality from e¤ort does not a¤ect the performance of prospective payment in any way. The in-
surer pays a xed price and reports any realized quality. In this notation, the prospective price implementing
the rst best in Proposition 1 is written as
p =
Z
R+

B(q)
@f(qje)
@e

dqZ
R+

D(q)
@f(qje)
@e

dq
;
and we omit the corresponding expression of the transfer.
Now we consider value index and cost reimbursement. The insurer observes the realized quality q and
cost C(e; r). Because q is stochastic, so is the index I(q; C; )  q+(1 )[K C]. Accordingly our analysis
has to proceed di¤erently from the previous subsection. The extensive form is as in Subsection 3.2, except
that in Stage 3, the insurer observes the realized quality according to the density chosen by the provider.
Again, consumers know neither q nor C(e; r). The level of the value index is all they observe.16
Consider an equilibrium in which the provider chooses e¤ort pair (be; br). In this equilibrium, consumers
believe that unit cost is C(be; br). Quality q will be drawn according to density f(qjbe). When the level of value
index is I, consumers believe that quality bq satises bq + (1   )[K   C(be; br)] = I. From this, the inferred
quality is
bq(Ij(be; br)) = I   (1  )[K   C(be; br)]

; (15)
where we have emphasized that the inference rule bq(Ij(be; br)) depends on the value index and equilibrium
16Quality can be any positive real number, and we assume that the value of K   C(e; r) is always positive. So for
any e¤ort pair, the range of the index must be strictly positive. We specify that, should the value index have a level
outside this range, consumers would believe that the quality is 0.
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e¤orts.
Consider a quality level, say eq. Under equilibrium e¤ort (be; br), when eq is realized, then bq(Ij(be; br)) = eq.
Suppose that the provider deviates from (be; br) to (e; r). The unit cost becomes C(e; r), and this will be
observed by the insurer but consumers continue to believe that the unit cost is C(be; br). When the same
quality eq is realized, the index changes to eI  eq + (1   )[K   C(e; r)]. Using the inference rule in (15),
consumers now believe that the quality is
bq(eIj(be; br)) = eI   (1  )[K   C(be; br)]

=
eq + (1  )[K   C(e; r)]  (1  )[K   C(be; br)]

= eq + 1  

[C(be; br)  C(e; r)] 6= eq: (16)
The point is that if the provider reduces the unit cost, the quality perceived by consumers becomes
higher. As an illustration, suppose that the realized quality eq is 10, and C(be; br) is also 10. Suppose that K
is 20, so the index and inferred quality are both 10. By raising cost e¤ort from br, the provider reduces the
unit cost from 10, so the index increases from 10. Consumers, however, continue to believe that the cost is
10, so any increase in the index is mistakenly attributed to an increase of quality from 10.
In (16), the inferred quality bq(eIj(be; br)) is larger than the realized quality eq if and only if C(e; r) < C(be; br).
This is the basic incentive for the provider to expend cost e¤ort. More important, the insurer can inuence
this incentive by choosing : a smaller  raises
1  

in (16). This implies a larger di¤erence between the
quality observed by the insurer and the quality inferred by consumers.
In equilibrium, consumers must not be misled, so the equilibrium e¤ort (be; br) must yield higher prot
for the provider than any deviation. Suppose that the provider deviates from the equilibrium (be; br). The
expected payo¤ from another e¤ort pair (e; r) is
m
Z
R+
D

q +
1  

[C(be; br)  C(e; r)] f(qje)dq   (e; r): (17)
In (17), we have used the inference rule (16) when the provider deviates from (be; br) to express the demand;
the integral is the expected revenue when the margin is set at m. E¤ort pair (be; br) is an equilibrium if it
maximizes (17).
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Formally, an equilibrium e¤ort pair (be; br) is a xed point of the following providers best-response-against-
belief correspondence:
(e; r) = argmax
e0;r0
(
m
Z
R+
D

q +
1  

[C(e; r)  C(e0; r0)]

f(qje0)dq   (e0; r0)
)
: (18)
By the Maximum Theorem, the correspondence (e; r) is upper-semi continuous when (17) is continuous
in (e; r) and (be; br). When (17) is strictly quasi-concave in (e; r) for any given (be; br), the correspondence 
is single-valued, so it is actually a continuous function. We let  be di¤erentiable. Furthermore, we will
assume that  is a contraction map, so it has a unique xed point. In the Appendix we write down su¢ cient
conditions for (17) to be strictly quasi-concave in (e; r) for any given (be; br), and for  to be a contraction
map.
The rst-order derivatives of (17) with respect to e¤orts are (30) and (31) in the Appendix. We set these
rst-order derivatives to zero, and then set (e; r) in the rst-order conditions to (be; br) to get, respectively,
Z
R+
m

D (q)

@f(qjbe)
@e

 D0 (q)C1(be; br)1  

f(qjbe) dq   1(be; br) = 0 (19)Z
R+
 m

D0 (q)C2(be; br)1  


f(qjbe)dq   2(be; br) = 0: (20)
For any margin m and weight , these two rst-order conditions yield the unique equilibrium e¤orts.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the prot function in (17) is strictly quasi-concave, and that the best-response
 is a contraction map. The insurer implements the rst-best e¤orts (e; r) in the unique continuation
equilibrium by setting the weight of the value index  and margin m to satisfy (19) and (20) at (be; br) =
(e; r) together with a suitable transfer T .
To contrast with Proposition 2, we can combine (19) and (20), and set (be; br) to (e; r) to get
1(e
; r)
2(e; e)
=
C1(e
; r)
C2(e; r)
  

1  
1
C2(e; r)
Z
R+
D (q)
@f(qje)
@e
dqZ
R+
D0 (q) f(qje)dq
; (21)
which can be interpreted similarly as (13) for the implementation of the rst best under deterministic quality
production.
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The result here contrasts with the su¢ cient-statistic result in Holmstrom (1979). In the classical principal-
agent model, the e¢ cient way to motivate unobservable e¤ort is to use payments based on signals that are
su¢ cient statistics of the agents action. Therefore, payments based on garbled informative signals are
suboptimal. Here, the insurer purposefully garbles the information about quality with cost information,
which is irrelevant to consumers. Garbled information leads to cost e¤ort a¤ecting demand through the
value index.
4.2 Stochastic cost reduction and dumping
In this subsection, we discuss dumping under cost reimbursement and prospective payment. Here, we
revert to the assumption that quality production is deterministic. We continue to assume that the insurer
seeks to implement a given quality-cost e¤ort pair. We now extend the model in Section 3 to include cost
heterogeneity. Let variable cost c be random. Given that K has been dened as the cost ceiling, we let c
vary on the closed support [0;K]. Let g(cje; r) denote the density of c, given e¤ort pair (e; r). Now we let
C(e; r)  R
0cK cg(cje; r)dc denote the average cost.
The use of a value index requires the insurer to obtain information about costs. We continue with the
assumption that the provider cannot manipulate information. When costs are stochastic, the insurer may
audit the provider to nd out about the cost distribution after cost e¤ort has been chosen. Alternatively,
the insurer may sample patient cases to obtain cost estimates.17 We assume that auditing or sampling are
su¢ ciently accurate to estimate the average variable cost, so the average cost C(e; r)  R
0cK cg(cje; r)dc
is used to construct the value index in cost reimbursement (see, for example, (9) in Lemma 1). The extensive
form is the same as in Subsection 3.2 with two changes. First, in Stage 3, the insurer uses the average cost
to construct the value index. Second, after Stage 4, the provider has an additional strategy of refusing to
serve a consumer after the cost realization.
Dumping refers to a provider refusing to give service to high-cost consumers. Under cost reimbursement,
realized costs are not the providers responsibility; therefore, the provider has no incentive to turn away
17 In the formal model, consumer demand is not determined until the value index is disclosed. However, we implicitly
assume that the provider serves some consumers even before that. The insurer samples these cases to estimate the
average cost. In practice, average-cost information from an earlier period may be used.
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high-cost consumers. However, by expending cost e¤ort r, the provider changes the average cost C(e; r), and
hence the value index. The incentive e¤ect on cost e¤ort remains the same as when costs are deterministic.
Under prospective payment, the provider has to internalize all variable costs. If a consumers cost turns out
to be higher than the prospective price, the provider will turn away the consumer. The rst best cannot be
implemented under prospective payment, whereas cost reimbursement with value index can.
We have separately discussed stochastic quality production and stochastic cost reduction. Extending to
the environment where quality production and cost reduction are both stochastic is straightforward. We
now reinterpret C(be; br) and C(e; r) in the inference equation (16) as the average costs R
0cK cg(cjbe; br)dc
and
R
0cK cg(cje; r)dc, respectively. The arguments for Proposition 3 remain valid.
4.3 Multiple qualities and cream skimming
Now we return to our basic model in Section 2, but let health services have two qualities, qA and qB .
Let eA and eB be two corresponding quality e¤orts. For ease of exposition, we simply let (qA; qB) =
(eA; eB). We extend the notation for demand, social benet, variable cost, and disutility in the obvious
way: D(qA; qB), B(qA; qB), C(qA; qB ; r), (qA; qB ; r). We also maintain the corresponding concavity and
convexity assumptions.
The social welfare is now
B(qA; qB) D(qA; qB)C(qA; qB ; r)  (qA; qB ; r): (22)
Let qA, q

B , r
 be the rst-best qualities and cost e¤ort, those that maximize (22).18 Under prospective
payment with transfer T , price p, and complete quality-information disclosure, the providers prot is
T + pD(qA; qB) D(qA; qB)C(qA; qB ; r)  (qA; qB ; r):
If the insurer discloses information of both qA and qB , a prospective price can be chosen to implement the
18They are characterized by the rst-order conditions:
B1(q

A; q

B) D1(qA; qB)C(qA; qB ; r) D(qA; qB)C1(qA; qB ; r)  1(qA; qB ; r) = 0
B2(q

A; q

B) D2(qA; qB)C(qA; qB ; r) D(qA; qB)C2(qA; qB ; r)  2(qA; qB ; r) = 0
 D(qA; qB)C3(qA; qB ; r)  3(qA; qB ; r) = 0;
which have the usual interpretations.
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rst best if and only if
B1(q

A; q

B)
D1(qA; q

B)
=
B2(q

A; q

B)
D2(qA; q

B)
(23)
(which is also the prospective price). This result is obtained by comparing the rst-order conditions for the
rst best (as in Footnote 18) and for the providers prot maximization (as in Proposition 1).
With a single quality, a single prospective price implements the rst best, as in Proposition 1, but with
multiple qualities, a single prospective price generally fails. The provider internalizes cost under prospective
payment. However, each qualitys marginal contribution to the providers revenue is generally di¤erent
from its marginal contribution to social benet. Condition (23) imposes the equality of these marginal
contributions. To see this, rearrange (23) to
B1(q

A; q

B)
B2(qA; q

B)
=
pD1(q

A; q

B)
pD2(qA; q

B)
; (24)
which says that the marginal rates of substitution between the two qualities have to be identical in the
social benet function and the revenue function. When (24) fails to hold, the provider will engage in cream
skimming by exploiting the di¤erential demand responses from di¤erent qualities.
To prevent cream skimming, the misalignment between the providers and the social tradeo¤ between
qualities must be resolved. Under prospective payment, the insurer can correct this misalignment by dis-
closing a quality index, rather than full information about the qualities. Suppose that the service qualities
are qA and qB . Construct the quality index J(qA; qB ;)  qA + (1   )qB , where 0    1. The in-
surer announces this quality index. When consumers observe J(qA; qB ;), they draw inferences about the
unobservable qualities qA and qB .
Analogous to Lemma 1, the equilibrium inference must be qualities bqA and bqB which solve
max
qA;qB ;r
T + pD(bqA; bqB) D(bqA; bqB)C(qA; qB ; r)  (qA; qB ; r)
subject to qA + (1  )qB = bJ = bqA + (1  )bqB : (25)
Any choice of qualities that achieve the quality index level bJ will yield the same inference. The provider
optimally chooses those quality e¤orts that maximize prot, given the quality index. A suitable choice of the
index weight  therefore can implement the rst-best marginal rate of substitution between the two quality
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e¤orts, as in (24). The insurer next chooses a prospective price. Given that the provider internalizes the
total cost, a quality index and a prospective payment are su¢ cient to implement the rst best.
Cost reimbursement with value index can perform exactly the same. Here, the insurer constructs a value
index: I(qA; qB ; C; A; B)  AqA + BqB + (1   A   B)[K   C], where the weights, A and B , are
positive and A+ B  1. Under cost reimbursement, equilibrium qualities and cost e¤ort must minimize
the disutility. Any equilibrium bqA, bqB and br solve
max
qA;qB ;e2
T +mD(bqA; bqB)  (qA; qB ; r)
subject to AqA + BqB + (1  A   B)[K   C(qA; qB ; r)] (26)
= bI = AbqA + BbqB + (1  A   B)[K   C(bqA; bqB ; br)]:
Using the value-index weights, the insurer controls how the provider trades o¤ between each quality and the
cost e¤ort, analogous to Lemma 1. Finally, using the margin, the insurer implements the rst best, as in
Proposition 2.
5 Conclusion
Prospective payment and cost reimbursement are common payment mechanisms to providers for health care
services. In the past thirty years, many theoretical and empirical studies have pointed out the di¤erent quality
and cost incentives of the two payment systems. In this paper, we have shown how an insurer, by optimally
choosing the content of public report, can make the two payment systems implement identical quality and
cost incentives. Our results are robust to environments where the providers productions of quality and cost
reduction are stochastic, and where health services have many qualities. Furthermore, cost reimbursement
may perform better than prospective payment when provider dumping of expensive consumers is possible.
Quality and value indexes may eliminate cream-skimming incentives.
The main point here is that information can act as an incentive strategy. Given that health service quality
is di¢ cult for consumers to know about, it is incumbent upon insurers and regulators to inform consumers.
The usual approach is a sort of empowering consumers with as much information as common consumer
cognition allows. Here, we question this approach. Information disclosure a¤ects a providers incentive to
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invest in quality and cost e¤orts, and should be considered along with payment mechanisms.
We have assumed that the insurer can make a lump-sum transfer to the provider. This is consistent
with the vast majority of the literature on provider payment design. Two recent papers study optimal
provider payment systems when lump-sum transfer is not allowed. Mougeot and Naegelen (2005) show
that the rst-best quality and cost e¤orts are not attainable without transfer. They then characterize the
constrained-optimal prospective price and margin. Miraldo et al. (2011) further characterize the constrained-
optimal prospective price list when providers have di¤erent cost types. In our model, the rst best may not
be achieved when transfer is not allowed; a single prospective price or margin cannot handle both distribution
and incentive problems. Yet, value-index reporting will continue to induce cost-reduction e¤ort under cost
reimbursement.
As the health care market evolves, payment systems have tended to become complicated. Pay-for-
performance incentive design is now discussed often in policy and theoretical research; see, for example,
works by Eggleston (2005), Kaarboe and Siciliani (2011), McClellan (2011), and Richardson (2011). Our
paper calls for a more fundamental approach. Any reward system must be based on available information. A
central issue, as we have shown here, is how the insurer may strategically disclose information. Furthermore,
information and nancial instruments should be chosen simultaneously to align incentives.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
For any given I and belief e, e and r maximize T +mD(q(e))   (e; r) subject to q(e) + (1   )[K  
C(e; r)] = I if and only if e and r minimize (e; r) subject to q(e) + (1  )[K   C(e; r)] = I, which is the
constrained minimization program in the Lemma. Minimizing (e; r) subject to q(e)+(1 )[K C(e; r)] =
I, we obtain the rst-order condition (10). Uniqueness follows from the strict convexity of  and C, and the
strict concavity of q.
Finally, if  = 1, the constraint becomes q(e) = I. Because  is increasing, the disutility-minimizing cost
e¤ort must be zero. If  = 0, the constraint becomes K  C(e; r) = I. Because both  and C are increasing
in e, the disutility-minimizing quality e¤ort must be zero.
Su¢ cient condition for the prot function (11) to be strictly quasi-concave in I
We rst show that (I; )  (e(I; ); r(I; )) is convex in I. Omit the variable  in the proof. Recall
that (e(I); r(I)) = argmine;r (e; r) subject to q(e) + (1  )[K  C(e; r)] = I. We modify this constrained
minimization program to mine;r (e; r) subject to G(e; r)  I, where G(e; r)  q(e) + (1  )[K   C(e; r)].
Clearly, G is concave because q is concave and C is convex. The relaxation of the constraint to the weak
inequality is of no consequence, because at any solution the constraint binds.
Consider two indexes I1 and I2, and I = I1 + (1  )I2, for some 0 <  < 1. Then G(e(I1); r(I1)) = I1
and G(e(I2); r(I2)) = I2. By the concavity of G, we have G(e(I1) + (1  )e(I2); r(I1) + (1  )r(I2)) >
G(e(I1); r(I1)) + (1   )G(e(I2); r(I2)) = I1 + (1   )I2 = I. Hence the e¤ort pair (e(I1) + (1  
)e(I2); r(I1) + (1   )r(I2)) achieves the index I. Therefore, (I; )  (e(I); r(I))  (e(I1) + (1  
)e(I2); r(I1) + (1  )r(I2)) < (e(I1); r(I1)) + (1  )(e(I2); r(I2))  (I1; ) + (1  )(I2; ). We
conclude that (I; ) is convex in I.
Next, we provide a su¢ cient condition for D(q(e(I; ))) to be strictly concave in I. This and the convexity
of (I; ) guarantee that the prot function (11) is strictly concave, and hence quasi-concave in I: The
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second-order derivative of D(q(e(I))) with respect to I is
D00 [q0e1(I; )]
2
+D0q00 [e1(I; )]
2
+D0q0e11(I; ); (27)
where we have suppressed the arguments in D, q, and their derivatives. Because D and q are increasing and
concave, (27) is negative if e11(I; ) < 0. Therefore, if e11(I; ) < 0, D(q(e(I))) is concave. We can use the
rst-order conditions from Lemma 1, apply the implicit function theorem to nd the derivatives of e and
r in terms of I. Then we can nd the second-order derivatives of e and r in terms of D, q, and . The
manipulations are tedious but straightforward, and omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2
By construction and Lemma 1, at  = , if the provider chooses I = I, the provider chooses e¤orts e
and r. Now at m = m, the derivative of (11) with respect to I is
mD0(q)q0(e)e1(I; )  1(I; );
which vanishes at I = I. Because the prot function is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in I, I is the
unique maximizer of (11). The value of the transfer T is chosen such that T +mD(q(e))  (e; r) = 0,
so the provider makes a zero prot.
Su¢ cient condition for the prot function (17) strictly quasi-concave in e and r
Let (e; r)  q + 1  

[C(be; br)  C(e; r)], we can rewrite the prot function in (17) as
L(e; r)  m
Z
R+
D ((e; r)) f(qje)dq   (e; r):
L(e; r) is strictly quasi-concave in e and r if at any (e; r), (e; r) 6= (be; br),
2L1L2L12   L21L22   L22L11 > 0 (28)
(Chiang and Wainwright (2005, p370)), where subscripts denote partial and cross-partial derivatives, and
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where
L1 = m
Z
R+
(Df 0 +D01f)dq   1
L2 = m
Z
R+
D02fdq   2
L11 = m
Z
R+
(D0021f +D
011f + 2D01f 0 +Df 00)dq   11
L22 = m
Z
R+
(D0022f +D
022f)dq   22
L12 = m
Z
R+
(D0012f +D012f +D02f 0)dq   12:
Su¢ cient condition for the correspondence (18) to be a contraction map
Let (18) be di¤erentiable. The correspondence is a contraction map if 11(e; r) 12(e; r)12(e; r) 22(e; r)
 <  < 1 (29)
at every nonnegative (e; r) (Hasselblatt and Katok (2003, p38)), where subscripts denote partial and cross-
partial derivatives, and where k k denotes the norm of the matrix.
Proof of Proposition 3
The partial derivatives of (17) with respect to e and r are
Z
R+
m
8>>><>>>:
D

q +
1  

[C(be; br)  C(e; r)]@f(qje)
@e

 D0

q +
1  

[C(be; br)  C(e; r)]C1(e; r)1  

f(qje)
9>>>=>>>;dq   1(e; r) (30)
Z
R+
 m

D0

q +
1  

[C(be; br)  C(e; r)]C2(e; r)1  


f(qje)dq   2(e; r): (31)
Then we set (e; r) to (be; br) and the two derivatives to zero. These equations then yield the equilibrium
conditions (19) and (20).
Given conditions (28) and (29) above, the prot function (17) is strictly quasi-concave and the corre-
spondence (18) is a contraction map, hence the equilibrium conditions characterize the unique pair of (e; r)
that maximizes prot. To implement the rst best, set (be; br) in (19) and (20) to (e; r). The values of 
and m are, respectively, given by (21) and
m
Z
R+

D(q)

@f(qje)
@e

dq   1(e; r)  2(e; r)

 C1(e
; r)
C2(e; r)

= 0:
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Finally, the value of T is again chosen so that T +m
R
R+ D(q)f(qje)dq   (e; r) = 0.
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Supplement: Example
We describe an example. Let (e; r)  (e + r), where  is increasing and convex.19 Also, let C(e; r) be
c(e   r), where c is increasing and convex, and q = e. Quality and cost e¤orts are perfect substitutes.
Consider the disutility minimization in Lemma 1. The constraint in (9) is now
e+ (1  )[K   c(e  r)] = I: (32)
Moreover, we have 1(e; r)=2(e; r) = 1, C1(e  r) = c0(e  r), and C2(e  r) =  c0(e  r). The rst-order
condition in (10) gives
1 =     (1  )c
0(e  r)
 (1  )c0(e  r) or 2(1  )c
0(e  r)   = 0: (33)
Totally di¤erentiate (32) and (33) with respect to e, r, and I, we have
e1(I; ) = r1(I; ) =
 c00(e  r)
 c00(e  r)(   (1  )c0(e  r))  c00(e  r)(1  )c0(e  r) =
1

: (34)
These derivatives implicitly dene e(I; ) and r(I; ) as the unique solution of the disutility minimization for
any , 0 <  < 1, and I, 0 < I.
Using (34), we can write the rst-order derivative of the prot function in (11) as
mD0(e(I; ))e1(I; )  1(I; )
= mD0(e)e1(I; )  0(e+ r)(e1(I; ) + r1(I; ))
=
1

[mD0(e)  20(e+ r)] :
Because D is concave and  is convex, the prot function is strictly quasi-concave.
To implement (e; r), set  and m to satisfy
 =
2c0(e   r)
1 + 2c0(e   r)
m = 2
0(e + r)
D0(e)
:
Given  and m, the provider will choose to achieve I = e + (1   )[K   c(e   r)] in the unique
equilibrium.
19This is the disutility function used in Ma (1994).
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